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OSCENITY -PRODUCTION OF OB-
SCENE PLAY.-[New York] The
defendants were prosecuted for a
violation of the Penal Law (sec.
1140-a, Consol. Laws, c. 40) pro-
hibiting the production of obscene
plays. They had dramatized an
ancient folk song by the name of
"Frankie and Johnnie" which nar-
rates the adventure of Johnnie, a
country lad, in a resort for drink-
ing, gambling and prostitution in
the middle of the last century. The
New York Court of Appeals finds
itself sharply divided in rendering
its decision. Judge Pound, who
writes the majority opinion, sup-
ported by Judges Cardozo, Lehman
and Kellogg, is of the belief that
the plot and language of the play
undoubtedly make it an "indecent"
dramatic composition. However, he
declares that the Court is not a
censor of plays or a regulator of
manners. "The question is whether
the tendency of the play is to excite
lustful and lecherous desire," says
Judge Pound, "not whether the
scene is laid in a low dive where
refined people are not found and
where the language is that of the
barrom rather than the parlor."
The question is whether young peo-
ple who would see this play -would
tend to have their standards of
right and wrong lowered, particu-
larly as to the sexual relation. The
question is not whether youth might
NEwMAN F. BAKER, Faculty Adviser
be coarsened or vulgarized by the
play. Continuing, Judge Pound be-
lieves that the production does not
come within the statute merely be-
cause it uses the language of the
street and not that of the scholar.
Nor does a stage representation of
prostitutes and their patrons in it-
self make a play obscene. In con-
clusion, however; the court issues
a word of warning-"We do not
purpose to sanction indecency on
the stage by this decision or to let
down the bars against immoral
shows or to hold that the depiction
of scenes of bawdry on the stage is
to be tolerated."
The minority, in the instant case,
make known their dissent but fur-
nish no opinion to support it. It
is not known why Judges Crane,
O'Brien, and Hubbs do not concur.
Perhaps, the subtle distinctions
drawn by the majority do not ap-
peal to them. They would condemn
a play tending to "coarsen or vul-
garize -youth." To them a stage
portrayal of women carrying on a
vicious trade, surrounded by their
male associates, is probably suffi-
cient to arouse judicial disfavor, to
say nothing of depicting the intro-
duction of an unsophisticated coun-
try boy like Johnnie into such an
environment: People v. Wendling
et al (New York, 1932), 258 N. Y.
451, 180 N. E. 169.
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Whatever may be the reasons
which move the minority, this de-
cision clearly is of the greatest im-
portance, coming as it does from
one of the most capable of the state
courts. A case concerning obscen-
ity does not involve a Federal ques-
tion and is unlikely to come within
the jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court.
Censorship of one kind or another
has always existed. It flourished in
half savage peoples, in ancient
China, in Greece, and in Rome:
"Encyclopedia of the Social Sci-
ences" (1931), Vol. 3 under "Cen-
sorship," p. 290. At first the prob-
lem was primarily a religious one.
However, with the development of
the Roman state political censor-
ship was established in order to
protect and preserve the govern-
ment: Grant and Angoff "Massa-
chusetts and Censorship" (1930) 10
Boston University Lav Review 51,
52. "The censor, in ancient Rome,
was a feared and mighty magis-
trate. As census taker, he could
exclude from the privileged census
oi citizens those he censured as
bad characters. Hence he became
a despotic superintendent of private
as well as public conduct and mor-
als": Rosenberg "Censorship in
the United States" (1928) 32 Law
Notes 50; Ferrero "Characters
and Events of History of the
Romans" in Lowell Lectures, 1922
Reprint, p. 24; Plutarch "Life of
Marcus Cato," Part XVII. For
centuries political censorship of the
sternest kind was taken as a matter
of course. Even as late as 1516
Sir Thomas More in his "Utopia"
proposed an ideal state wherein
criticism of the governing powers
was to be punishable by death. It
was only after a number of Euro-
pean revolutions and a gradual in-
tellectual evolution that freedom
from the censor began to be felt
politically. Censorship entered up-
on its third and last phase when
the idea that obscenity could be
punished took root in Anglo-Saxon
law. Not until well into the 18th
century was it thought "that a mere
writing could be other than a direct
offense against church and state":
Grant and Angoff "Massachusetts
and Censorship" (1930) 10 Boston
University Law Review 51; King v.
Curl (1715) 2 Str. 789. This case
established obscenity 'as a crime at
common law. Over a hundred years
later Lord Chief Justice Cockburn
attempted to lay down a test of
obscenity, which has ever since
caused difficulty because of its in-
adequacy: Regina v. Hicklin,
(1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 360. This
test was "whether the tendency of
the matter charged as obscenity is
to deprave and corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral in-
fluences, and into whose hands a
publication of this sort may fall."
Cockburn's standard was unfor-
tunately adopted in England, Can-
ada, and the United States. It was
too broad. "By this rule, that which
would deprave any person whose
mind was open to depravity was
obscene. One living person pos-
sessing such a mind would embrace
the matter within the law. The
additional requirement that such
person must be one into whose
hands the publication might fall,
afforded little solace. The most
expensive work circulating among
a very limited class of people, as-
suming that all the people in that
particular class were virtuous,
might be lost or stolen, falling
eventually into the hands of a per-
son ready to be depraved by the
tome. Logically, no book which
even in the most mildly soporific
manner treated sex, could escape
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such a law. There was certain to
be at least one objectionable person
whom the law must protect":
Grant and Angoff "Massachusetts
and Censorship" (1930) 10 Boston
University Law Review 54. The
fact that Lord Cockburn's standard
was too broad did not, however,
prevent its use: Steele v. Brannan
(1872) L. R. 7 C. P. 261; 26 L. T.
N. S. 509; People v. Muller (1884)
32 Hun. 209, 2 N. Y. Cr. R. 279
(affirmed 96 N. Y. 408, 2 N. Y.
Cr. R. 375, 48 Am. Rep. 635);
United States v. Bebout (D. C.)
(1886) 28 Fed. 522; Gilmore v.
State (1903) 118 Ga. 299, 45 S. E.
226; Rex v. Beaver (1905) 9 Ont.
L. R. 418, 9 Can. Crim. Cases 415;
Commonwealth v. Buckley (1909)
200 Mass. 346, 86 N. E. 910; United
States v. Kennerly (1913) 209 Fed.
119; Commonwealth v. Allison
(1917) 227 Mass. 57, 116 N. E.
265. The primary result of this
adoption of the standard was to
render the subject of obscenity still
more ill-defined and uncertain, and
to keep it in a continual chaotic
state.
Nevertheless, any existing uncer-
tainty has never lessened the clamor
of many for a greater censorship
in all fields where obscenity might
enter. Every state has enacted
statutes against things obscene, and
all of these statutes treat the sub-
ject in practically the same way.
For a typical illustration of these
state statutes see: Ill. Crim Code,
ch. 38, sections 468-472. Such or-
ganizations as the New England
Watch and Ward Society and the
New York Society for the Suppres-
sion of Vice tlso have been founded,
to say nothing of the appointment
in many large cities of boards of
censors for dramatic presentations,
motion pictures, and publications.
However, all such activity eventu-
ally leads back to the inevitable
question, "Just what is 'obscene'
and what should be kept from pub-
lication?" Some courts and writ-
ers have decided, notwithstanding
Lord Cockburn, that "obscene," "in-
decent," and words of like connota-
tion have no technical significance,
nor that they can be defined by
law: United States v. Harmon
(1891) 45 Fed. 414 (affirmed 50
Fed. 921); Timinoits v. United
States (1898) 85 Fed. 204, 30 C.
C. A. 74; Law Notes, July, 1924,
p. 65; New York Law Review,
March-April, 1927, p. 86; Law
Notes, May, 1927, p. 25. One
author says, "There is not and can-
not be any definite and universally
accepted standard by which may be
decided what is decent and clean
and what is indecent and ob-
scene. Under our system of laws
this issue must be determined by
judges and juries and upon the trial
of an indictment for indecency all
twelve of the jurors must agree as
to the quality of the act charged,
or no guilt can be established":
New York Law Review, March-
April, 1927, p. 86.
It may be expected that decisions
of courts have sharply conflicted
(as in the instant case) when in-
terpreting the problem of how far
the state should go in the field of
censorship. The state has two
ideals, (1) to encourage individual-
ism in all fields of rtistic enter-
prise, and (2) to protect the indi-
vidual against everything harmful.
In the statutory interpretation of
the word "obscene" these two ideals
often conflict. The resulting deci-
sions seem to depend upon whether
judges are "liberal" or "strict." De-
cisions have been rather too numer-
ous to cite other than a few of the
leading ones: In re Worthington
Co. (1894) 30 N. Y. S. 361, 24
L. R. A. 110; People v. Eastman
(1907) 188 N. Y. 478, 81 N. E.
459; St. Hubert Guild v. Quinn
(1909) 118 N. Y. S. 582, 64 Misc.
Rep. 336; Commonwealth v. Buck-
ley (1909) 200 Mass. 346, 86 N. E.
910; United States v. Kennerly
(1913) 209 Fed. 119; People v.
Brainard (1920) 183 N. Y. S. 452,
192 App. Div. 816; Halsey v. The
New York Society (1922) 234 N.
Y. 1, 136 N. E. 219; American
Mercury, Inc. v. Chase (1926) (D.
C. Mass.) 13 Fed. (2d) 224; Amer-
ican Mercury, Inc. v. Kiely (1927)
19 Fed. (2d) 295; Commonwealth
v. Friede (1930) 271 Mass. 318, 171
N. E. 472; Commonwealth v. De
Lacey (1930) 271 Mass. 327, 171
N. E. 455; United Stales v. Den-
nett (1930) (C. C. A. N. Y.) 39
Fed. (2d) 564; People v. Pesky
(1930) 243 N. Y. S. 193, 230 App.
Div. 200 (affirmed 254 -N. Y. 373,
173 N. E. 227).
In the instant case, after con-
sidering- the problem, the writer is
inclined to dissent. The production
of the play "Frankie and Johnnie"
was a public one advertised to draw
people from all walks of life. It
was performed in a theater con-
stantly attended by those not know-
ing the nature of the performance
they were to see. If we allow the
need of the second ideal of the
state-that of protecting the indi-
vidual from everything harmful-
then there is no place, outside of
the magazine trade, where the law
should be more stringent in carry-
ing out this idea. Had the per-
formance been a private one, and
not attended by the general public,
then the majority opinion would
bear greater weight,
It is admitted that many may
argue, as does Judge Pound, that a
court is neither a censor of plays
nor a regulator of manners. A sys-
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tem wherein judges were licensors
of plays would be odious to them.
Courts refuse to enjoin people's at-
tempted speech: Ex parte Tucker
(1920) 110 Tex. 335, 220 S. W. 75.
Should they not also refrain from
suppressing the plays that people
wish to see? The problem presents
worthy arguments on both sides.
How can the individual conclude
which position is more nearly cor-
rect in view of the indecision which
has marked the past?
"The matter is one incapable of
a logical solution. The best that
can be done is to see that the sober
common sense of average men con-
trols it, excluding both the bigots
for revenue and the filth exploiters
for revenue": "Obscene Plays"




eral] A Federal prohibition agent,
Martin, went to the defendant's
home accompanied by three men,
residents of the community, who in-
troduced Martin as a business man
on vacation who desired to obtain
whiskey. After Martin made sev-
eral fruitless requests for liquor,
conversation disclosed that the de-
fendant, Martin, and one of the
others were soldiers in the same
World War army division. After
the agent expressed another re-
quest, the defendant left home and
returned within thirty minutes with
whiskey which he exchanged for
five dollars offered by Martin. De-
fendant was convicted of selling in-
toxicating liquor in violation of the
National Prohibition Act 27 U. S.
-C. A. and sentenced to eighteen
months' imprisonment. He assigned
as error that the trial judge with-
drew from the jury the defense of
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entrapment. Held: On appeal
(Soper, J. dissenting), the judg-
ment was affirmed; the trial court
properly instructed the jury that
there was no evidence that the de-
fendant was induced or entrapped
to sell liquor. Sorrels v. United
States (C. C. A. 4th 1932) 57 F.
(2d) 973.o
Apparently the earliest instances
of using the defense of entrapment
occurred where property was taken
by the defendant with the owner's
consent or inducement and hence
not "against the owner's will":
Parker, J., in Sorrells v. United
States, supra; Bishop "Criminal
Law" (9th ed. 1923) secs. 926t.-
z. e. The entrapment plea was later
extended to the situation where the
defendant committed an act at the
suggestion or procurement of gov-
ernment officials or their agents;
recently its use has multiplied where
indictments concern offenses against
narcotics and liquor laws. See an-
notations to Butts v. United States
(C. C. A. -8th 1921) 273 F. 35, 18
A. L. R. 143 at 146; Robinson v.
United States (C. C. A. 8th 1928)
32 F. (2d) 505, 66 A.. L. R. 468
at 478. This increase possibly may
illustrate the fact that "everybody
knows that more devices and sub-
terfuges are resorted to in attempt-
ing to violate prohibitory liquor
laws, and to evade punisliment
therefor, than in all other depart-
ments of criminal law combined":
DeGraff v. State (1909) 2 Okla.
Cr. 519, 532, 103 Pac. 538, 550.
In decisions dealing with liquor
violations under the National Pro-
hibition Act, the Federal courts
probably agree that there should be
"some evidence" of entrapment be-
fore the plea can be supported:
Hall v. United States (C. C. A. 4th
1931) 46 F. (2d) 461. Courts are
divided whether entrapment is a
question of law for the judge or a
question of fact for the jury: Jarl
v. United State0 (C. C. A. 8th
1927) 19 F. (2d) 891; cases infra.
Opinions are diverse whether or
not the evidence of entrapment
goes to nullify and purge the de-
fendant's physical acts of criminal-
ity and culpability or merely meas-
ures and mitigates the punishment
for the criminal act. See Wood-
rough, J. in United States v. Wash-
ington (D. C. Neb. 1927) 20 F.
(2d) 160.
In the principal case, Judge
Parker and the dissenting judge dis-
agree about the effect of two al-
leged precedents: Butts v. United
States, supra, and Newman v.
United States (C. C. A. 4th 1924)
299 F. 128, (1923) 289 F. 712.
Judge Parker is willing to limit the
latter case, but Judge Soper de-
clares: "The opinion of the court
(in the principal case) announces
a rule of law contrary to that stated
in its former decision in Newman
v. United States . . . It is likely
enough that the rule of entrap-
ment now generally accepted in
other federal circuits is an exten-
sion of the law laid down in those
cases like larceny, in which the
consent of the injured party is in-
consistent with the existence of the
crime; but the development, illog-
ical though it may have been, has
taken place, and we should gain
nothing .if we should now retrace
our steps. . . . The facts in the
pending case justify an application
of the prevailing rule." Both the
Butts and Newman decisions in-
volve violations of narcotics stat-
utes, and it is difficult to understand
what valid effect those cases could
have in liquor sale fact situations
unless we are willing to assume
that a "rule" or "principle" or
"doctrine" can be "derived" from a
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past, decided narcotics case and then
can be "applied" to future, different
and new facts arising from a liquor
sale. Judge Soper assumes this,
and Judge Parker does also: "While
the case at bar is one involving the
violation of the liquor laws, the
rule which we are asked to approve
would not apply in liquor cases
alone, but would furnish a haven of
refuge to criminals generally." It
is not easy to assent to the assump-
tions of either judge.
The dissenting judge maintains
that the "doctrine" of Butts v.
United States has been accepted in
every Federal circuit; the cases
cited originated in such varied cir-
cumstances as possession, sale, and
transportation of liquor, liquor con-
spiracy, liquor nuisance, liquor sale
to soldier in uniform, narcotics sale,
and possession, and bribery. United
States Supreme Court decisions on
entrapment deal with violations of
postal regulations. There is no
high court opinion on entrapment in
a liquor sale offense under the Na-
tional Prohibition Act. See Casey
v. United States (1928) 276 U. S.
413, 72 L. Ed. 632, 48 S. Ct. 373
(narcotics).
In lower Federal court opinions
in liquor offenses since the National
Prohibition Act, where entrapment
has been advanced defensively, cer-
tain formulae or tests receive em-
phasis by the judges. The or-
dinary type of jury instruction ap-
pears in Weiderman v. United
States (C. C. A. 8th 1926) 10 F.
(2d) 745; see United States v.
Washington, supra. After ex-
amining the whole field of the evi-
dence, sometimes courts are content
to declare the government is
"estopped" from prosecuting or is
prevented by "public policy"; how
illusory such phrases may become
are illustrated in subsequent cita-
tions. If the court believe that testi-
mony reveals a "sale," there is no
ground available for pleading en-
trapment: Johnstone v. United
States (C. C. A. 9th 1924) 1 F.
(2d) 928. When the eye of the
court focuses upon the defendant,
the judge attempts to discover the
defendant's conduct or mental state
before and at the commission of
the alleged crime. Cf. United
States v. Certain Quantities of In-
toxicating Liquors (D. C. N. H.
1923) 290 F. 824. If the criminal
intent to violate the law originated
in the accused's mind prior to the
alleged offense, he is not likely to
be successful in his entrapment
plea: Reyff v. United States (C.
C. A. 9th 1924) 2 F. (2d) 39; Rit-
ter v. United States (C. C. A. 9th
1923) 293 F. 187; see decisions
infra. It appears that "origin of the
criminal intent" in whole or in part
as a formula would be difficult to
use in trying to allocate the time
and portion of the criminal intent
supplied by the defendant or the en-
trapping government officials.
Still pointing to the accused, a
court often inquires into defend-
ant's previous reputation and con-
duct to note whether he is an in-
nocent, law-abiding, or honest citi-
zen or whether he is a bootlegger
"criminal," habitual offender, or in
the business of crime or selling il-
licit liquor. United States v. Wash-
ington, supra. Defendants who
claimed no prior illegal transactions
in alcohol won new trials: Silk
and Meek v. United States (C. C.
A. 8th 1927) 16 F. (2d) 568; Dris-
kill v. United States (C. C. A. 9th
1928) 24 F. (2d) 535. In indict-
ments for conspiracy to violate the
National Prohibition Act, usually
coupled with counts for illegal sales
of liquor, past conduct of defend-
ants will be investigated: O'Brien
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v. United *States (C. C. A. 7th
1931) 51 F. (2d) 674; Polski v.
United States (C. C. A. 8th 1929)
33 F. (2d) 686, certiorari denied
(1929) 280 U. S. 591, 74 L. Ed.
640, 50 S. Ct. 39; DeMayo v. United
States (C. C. A. 8th 1929) 32 F.
(2d) 472; Newman v. United States
(C. C. A. 9th 1928) 28 F. (2d)
681, certiorari denied (1929) 279
U. S. 839, 73 L. Ed. 869, 49 S. Ct.
253; Corcoran v. United States (C.
C. A. 8th 1927) 19 F. (2d) 901;
St. Clair v. United States (C. C. A.
8th 1927) 17 F. (2d) 886; Silk and
Meek v. United States, supra;
United States v. Wray (D. C., .N.
D., Ga. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 429; Grove
v. United States (C. C. A. 4th 1925)
3 F. (2d) 965, certiorari denied
(1925) 268 U. S. 691, 69 L. Ed.
1159, 45 S. Ct. 511; Zucker v.
United States (C. C.-A. 3rd 1923)
288 F. 12, certiorari denied Krivit
v. United States (1923) 262 U. S.
750, 756, 67 L. Ed. 1214, 1218, 43
S. Ct. 525, 703. Researches into de-
fendant's past acts may be relevant
to reach his criminal intent or to
measure and mitigate his punish-
ment, but it is doubtful whether
such explorations aid the jury to
decide the issue, namely, the al-
leged act for which the accused is
tried.
Evidence of defendant' prior
conduct will often be mentioned in
formulae and tests regarding the
government agents. Purchases of
liquor by decoys, agents, or officials
were not entrapments: Kendjerski
v. United WStates (C. C. A. 6th
1926) 9 F. (2d) 909; Ransey v.
United States (C. C. A. 6th 1920)
268 F. 825; Saucedo v. United
States (C. C. A, 5th 1920) 268
F. 830. If the government offi-
cials had reasonable suspicions that
the defendant was engaging in
crime, entrapment was not avail-
able as a defense: Driskill v.
United States, supra; DeLong v.
United States (C. C. A. 8th 1925)
4 F. (2d) 244; cf. Rossi v. United
States (C. C. A. 8th 1923)293 F.
896. Formulae occasionally con-
tain expressions of the officers' good
faith, honest belief, or purpose in
ascertaining defendant's activities
or their purpose to detect and en-
trap the accused in an offense:
Murphy v. United States (C. C. A.
5th 1924) 2 F. (2d) 599; United
States v. Reisenweber (C. C. A. 2nd
1923) 288 F. 520 (liquor nuisance);
Farley v. United States (C. C. A.
8th 1921) 269 F. 721. These latter
tests tend to confuse the issue be-
fore the jury by entering discus-
sion of the officers' suspicions; see
Parker, J., in Sorrells v. United
States, supra.
Where the entrapping officer's
conduct is in evidence, the courts'
formulae and tests question whether
or not the officer misrepresented
himself or pretended a plan,
whether he offered, originated or
initiated a plan, or whether he
suggested, solicited, encouraged,
persuaded, aided, abetted, pro-
cured, beguiled, induced, deceived,
enticed, or lured the defendant
into committing a crime. If
the officer merely presented the
accused with an opportunity to vio-
late the statute and the accused
"took the bait," the entrapment plea
will not be successful: Jordan v.
United States (C. C. A. 5th 1924)
2 F. (2d) 598; Porter v. United
States (C. C. A. 8th 1929) 31 F.
(2d) 544; Hadley v. United States
(C. C. A. 8th 1927) 18 F. (2d) 507;
United States v. Smith (D. C.. S.
D., Tex. 1930) 43 F. (2d) 173. The
general assumption appears to be
that the government agents should
not create crime or manufacture it
for the purpose of prosecuting.
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The principal decision seems to
indicate the court's unwillingness to
interfere with results of govern-
ment agent's tactics in a liquor sale
situation. The court does not sanc-
tion the idea that prosecuting crime
is a game in which entrapment is
another sporting defense. Although
the entrapment plea was unknown
at common law and has not been
granted by legislatures, courts have
assumed the power to grant an ac-
cused this privilege. Since it is
not within the province of a court
to censure government action, un-
less constitutional guarantees are in
issue, the entrapment defense should
be discouraged by the courts. En-
trapment might well be a political
and not a judicial controversy: see
United States v. Washington, supra.
Condemnation or criticism of the
government entrapping defendants
to commit crime should come from




TURE OF THE OFFENsE.-[Virginia]
The defendant was indicted for
breaking and entering a dwelling
house with the intent "to commit
an assault" and "to maim, disfigure,
disable, and kill." At the trial the
defendant's counsel moved that the
Commonwealth elect under what
section of the statute the accused
would be tried. The prosecution
elected to try him under a section
defining as a crime the breaking
and entering "with intent to com-
mit murder, rape, or robbery" (Vir-
ginia Code [1919], sec. 4438). The
defendant objected to the court's in-
structions based on that section on
the ground that the indictment
charged, as all parties seemed to
admit, a crime defined in another
section as breaking and entering
"with intent to commit . . . any
felony other than murder, rape, or
robbery" and carrying lesser penal-
ties (Virginia Code [1919], sec.
4439). The jury found the defend-
ant guilty and imposed a sentence
of five years in the penitentiary, a
term possible under either section of
the statute. Held: that the elec-
tion after motion by the defendant
had the effect of amending the in-
dictment as provided by statute:
Sullivan v. Commonwealth (Va.
1931) 161 S. E. 297.
The amending statute upon which
the court relied provides that an
indictment may be amended by the
trial court, to cure any defect in
form or variance with the proof,
"provided such amendment does not
change the nature of the offense
charged . . . ": Virginia Code
(1919) sec. 4878. This restriction
on the amending power is, in other
jurisdictions, usually implied from
the prohibition, constitutional, stat-
utory, or both. against changes of
substance. At common law there
can be no amendment, either as to
form or substance, without the con-
sent of the grand jury presenting
the indictment: Ex parte Bain
(1887) 7 Sup. Ct. 781, 121 U. S. 1;
Joyce "Indictments" (2d ed. 1924)
sec. 13; 2 Bishop "Criminal Pro-
cedure" (1913) sec. 708. A forti-
ori is this true whenever there is
a constitutional requirement; Pat-
rick v. People (1890) 132 Ill. 529,
24 N. E. 619. These rights may
be abrogated by statute in so far
as constitutional guarantees are not
infringed upon: See 1 Bishop,
supra, sec. 97: 2 Id. sec. 711. But,
irrespective of statutes, any amend-
ment changing the nature of the
offense is prohibited as being a
change of substance, violating the
constitutional right to presentment
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by a grand jury: State v. Good-
rich (1865) 46 N. H. 186; Wilbur
v. State (1912) 101 Miss. 392, 58
So. 7; Joyce, supra, Sec. 137. The
only difficult part of the problem is,
as illustrated by the instant case, in
determining what is a change in
the nature of the offense. It is usu-
ally sufficient ground to reverse a
case if statute makes any distinction
between the original and amended
charge; courts jealously enforce the
principle with little regard to the
actual prejudice to the defendant:
State v. Jones (1888) 101 N. C.
719, 8 S. E. 147 (indictment charg-
ing "an attempt to burn a dwelling
house" amended to read "an attempt
to burn a store"); State v. Sowell
(1910) 85 S. C. 278, 67 S. E. 316
(indictment for larceny and house-
breaking committed in the daytime
amended to allege that the crime
was committed in the nighttime);
State v. Quinn (N. J. 1932) 158
At. 834 (charge of carrying deadly
weapons changed to one of conceal-
ment of weapons). It is imma-
terial that the amendment charges a
lesser crime: Commonwealth v.
Adams (1891) 92 Ky. 134, 17 S.
W. 276 (the judge, thinking evi-
dence insufficient to support indict-
ment charging forgery, altered it to
charge obtaining money under false
pretenses) ; People v. "Motello
(1913) 157 App. Div. 510, 142 N. Y.
Sup. 622 (words "malice afore-
thought" stricken out to change in-
dictment for murder to one for
manslaughter). However, where
an indictment charges a number of
crimes the prosecution may strike
out some of them: State v. Cle-
ment (1910) 80 N. J. L. 669, 77
At. 1067; State v. Lamb (1911) 81
N. J. L. 234, 80 Atl. 111; Common.
wealth v. Smith (1914) 24 Pa. Dist.
Rep. 936. But this is strictly not
an amendment: it is hardly more
than the ordinary nolle prosequi and
could not possibly prejudice the de-
fendant. This situation is to be
distinguished from that where part
of the allegations are quashed to
make a different charge: Duty v.
Stdte (1908) 54 Tex. Crim. Rep.
613, 114 S. W. 817. But necessary
allegations may be added when the
original indictment was plainly in-
tended to charge the same crime as
charged after the amendment:
Chrisman v. Superior Court (1922)
59 Cal. App. 305, 210 Pac. 632;
People v. Sims (Mich. 1932) 241
N. W. 247.
The Virginia Constitution is
lacking in the usual safeguards; the
only provision relevant here being
"That in all criminal prosecutions
a man hath a right to demand the
cause and nature of his accusa-
tion . . . ": Constitution of
Virginia (1902) sec. 8, par. 2. But
this should not affect the holding of
the court, as the precise point is
covered by the statute. It is also
to be noted that the requirement of
presentment by grand jury con-
tained in the Fifth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution is applic-
able; the provision is considered as
jurisdictional and therefore bind-
ing on state courts: Ex parte
Bain, supra. So it can hardly be
said that the Virginia court is to
be judged under any separate
standard.
In view of the general attitude of
strictness 6btaining in the enforce-
ment of safeguards established for
the benefit of accused persons, it is
difficglt to agree with the holding
of the court in the instant case.
The court was of the opinion that
the two sections of the statute
merely defined degrees of the same
crime. In other words, it con-
sidered that the difference in in-
tent indicated in the two sections
488 RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
did not change the fundamental na-
ture of the offense. But, as was
pointed out in the dissenting opin-
ion, a difference of intent may be
the distinction between two crimes,
or a crime and no crime at all;
the subjective test is frequently
used in the field of criminal law. It
is common professional knowledge
that the subjective attitude or
mental phenomena of "malice afore-
thought" marks the distinction be-
tween murder and manslaughter;
and it has been held that an in-
dictment for manslaughter cannot
be amended to charge murder;
People v. Granice (1875) 50 Cal.
447; and cf. the converse, People
V. Motello, supra. It is true that
these two crimes are designated by
different names, which is not true
in the instant case, but it does not
seem that the mere nomenclature
should be controlling. The court
relied on two other Virginia de-
cisions holding that the word "fel-
oniously" could be stricken out:
Kelley v. Commonwealth (1924)
140 Va. 522, 125 S. E. 437; Young
v. Contnwnwealth (1931) 155 Va.
1156, 156 S. E. 565. But, as men-
tioned in the dissenting opinion
of the principal case, these two
cases involved indictments really
charging misdemeanors; hence, the
word "feloniously" was surplusage,
and its deletion did not change the
nature of the offense. In England,
where there is a very broad amend-
ing statute practically leaving the
matter to the discretion of the trial
judge (14 & 15 Victoria, chap. 100,
sec. 1) it is held that the word
"felonious" cannot be stricken out
when the effect would be to change
a felony to a misdemeanor; Regis
v. Wright (1860) 2 Fost. & F. 320.
Another case cited by the court
seems still less in point; it involved
only the amending of a bill of par-
ticulars: Jennings v. Common-
wealth (1922) 133 Va. 726, 112, S.
E. 602.
The mere fact that the legislature
saw fit to use separate sections
should be some indication that each
section was intended to describe a
separate offense: cf. State v.
Jones, supra; State v. Sowell, supra;
State v. Quinn, supra. A distinc-
tion was in fact made and separate
penalties provided. It is submitted
that, even if the two sections may
be said only to differentiate different
degrees of the same crime, the dis-
tinction comes within the meaning
of the amending statute; perhaps
the latter statute should have been
worded more explicitly: cf. State
v. Keifer (1917) 183 Iowa 319, 163
N. W. 698, and statute there cited.
The court reinforced its decision
by considering that, as the amend-
ment was brought about by the de-
fendant's motion, any irregularity
was waived. It is usually held, how-
ever, that consent to an improper
amendmehnt does not estop the de-
fendant from making later objec-
tion: People v. Campbell (N. Y.
1859) 4 Parker Crim. Rep. 386;
Commonwealth v. Adams, supra;
Dodge v. United States (1919) 258
Fed. 300. Contra: State v. Faile
(1895) 43 S. C. 52, 20 S. E. 798.
The court also held that the error,
if any, was immaterial, as the sen-
tence given was possible under
either section. But the jury would
likely be influenced by the possible
penalties available.
The guaranty of presentment by
a grand jury appears to be founded
on two principles: first, to mini-
mize the danger of false official ac-
cusation with its accompanying stig-
ma and suffering; second, to give
the accused adequate opportunity to
prepare his defense. The facts of
the instant case suggest that these
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principles were satisfied. But it
must be remembered that these safe-
guards are primarily for the protec-
tion of the innocent, and their in-
violability has always been one of
the deep-rooted principles of Anglo-
American law. On this basis the
decision in the instant case can
hardly stand. But whether it is de-
sirable, because of modem circum-
stances, to relax the strictness of
these principles-to give the courts
a greater discretion in their applica-
tion-is a matter beyond the scope
of this comment. The case may in-
dicate an official reaction against




ENc.-[Federal] Defendant was in-
dicted for violation of the National
Prohibition Act. The indictment
contained three counts under 41
Stat. 308, 314 (27 U. S. C. A. 12,
33): (1) for maintaining a com-
mon nuisance by keeping for sale
at a specified place intoxicating
liquor, (2) for unlawful possession
of intoxicating liquor, and (3) for
unlawful sale of such liquor. The
jury returned a verdict of guilty on
the first count but not guilty on the
other two counts. The defendant
appealed on the ground of incon-
sistency in the verdict. Held: Af-
firmed. Consistency in the verdict
is not necessary: Dunn v. U. S.
(1932) 52 S. Ct. 189.
There was a vigorous dissent by
Mr. Justice Butler who stated his
conception of the law to be that (1)
"When, upon an indictment charg-
ing the same offense in different
counts, the jury acquits as to one
and convicts as to the other, de-
fendant is entitled to a new trial;
and (2) that when different crimes
are charged in separate counts and
the jury acquits as to one and con-
victs on the other, the conviction
will be sustained, unless, excluding
the facts which the jury in reaching
its verdict necessarily found not
proved, it must be held a's a matter
of law that there is not sufficient
evidence to warrant the verdict of
guilty; and where the evidence out-
side the facts so conclusively nega-
tived by the acquittal on one count
is not sufficient to sustain guilt on
the other count, defendant is en-
titled to a new trial."
It must be admitted that there is
much authority for Mr. Justice But-
ler's view. The general rule is that
no form of verdict in criminal cases
will be good which creates a repug-
nancy or absurdity in the convic-
tion: 2 Bishop "New Criminal Pro-
cedure (2nd Ed.)" No. 1015, a, (5).
Thus, where one by different counts
is accused of two crimes which by
reason of their nature cannot be
committed by the same person, a
verdict of guilty on both counts has
been held so inconsistent that no
judgment can be entered thereon:
Regina v. Evans (1856) 7 Cox C. C.
151; Rosenthal v. U. S. (C. C. A.
9, 1921) 276 F. 714; Commonwealth
v. Haskins (1879) 128 ,Mtss. 60;
Tobin v. People (1882) 104 Ill. 565.
Regina" v. Evans, supra, often is
cited as a leading case. There, one
count accused the prisoner of steal-
ing sheep. Another charged him
with having received them on the
same day. There was a general
verdict of guilty on both counts. In
announcing a new trial for incon-
sistency in the verdict, the court
said, "This record must, therefore,
be dealt with as if there had been
a special verdict on which the court
should find matter which would not
justify either an acquittal or a con-
viction."
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In Rosenthal v. U. S., supro,
three were indicted under Act of
February 13, 1913, 37 Stat. 670, on
two counts: (1) having bought and
received property stolen from a car
then being a shipment in interstate
commerce, knowing it to have been
stolen and (2) that at the same time
and place they had that property in
their possession under like circum-
stances and with like knowledge.
The appellant was acquitted by the
jury on the first count, but was
found guilty on the second count.
The court reversed the judgment
for the reason that the two findings
were "wholly inconsistent and
conflicting."
Thus, one accused in different
counts of the same crime, there
being no difference in the means al-
leged to have been employed, may
not be deemed guilty on a verdict of
conviction on one count but of ac-
quittal on the other: Speiller v.
U. S. (C. C. A. 3, 1929) 31 F.
(2nd) 682, 684; State 1. Akers
(1919) 278 Mo. 368, 370; State v.
Hendrick (1904) 179 Mo. 300, 307.
Cf. U. S. v. Malone (C. C. A. 2,
1881) 9 F. 897, 900. In every such
case the question of law for the
court is always whether, outside the
fact eliminated by the verdict of
not guilty, the evidence was suffi-
cient to warrant the conviction:
Hohenadel Brewing Co. v. U. S.
(C. C. A. 3, 1924) 295 F. 489;
Peru v. U. S. (C. C. A. 8, 1925)
4 F. (2nd) 881; Murphy V. U. S.
(C. C. A. 8, 1927) 18 F. (2nd) 509;
Boyle v. U. S. (C. C. A. 8, 1927)
22 F. (2d) 547; and see Baldini v.
U. S. (C. C. A. 6, 1923) 286 F.
133.
The reason for the rule against
inconsistency is said to be grounded
upon the inference that the jury has
made a mistake. The modern
tendency, however, is to give effect
to the verdict where the jury's ac-
tion reflects mere inconsistency in
the consideration of the evidence
which results in an apparently il-
logical conclusion: Hesse v. U. S.
(C. C. A. 9, 1928) 28 F (2d) 770;
U. S. v. Anderson (C. C. A. 9,
1929) 31 F(2nd) 436; Pancratz
Lumber Co. v. U. S. (C. C. A. 9,
1931) 50 F(2nd) 174; People v.
Haupt (1928) 247 N. Y. 369, 160
N. E. 643.
There is no more reason to say
that the jury made a mistake to the
prejudice of the defendant than to
say that its mistake was in his
favor. The tender regard for the
defendant under the old rule is
certainly an obstacle to the pro-
tection of the general public against
criminals. Instead of making a
presumption that the inconsistency
in the verdict prejudiced the de-
fendant, it seems more sensible for
the reviewing court to determine
whether or not the so-called error
is such as would probably cause a
different result in a new trial. A
reasonable explanation of the jury's
conduct in reaching such inconsist-
ent verdicts is that, "The jury did
not speak their real conclusions,
but that does not show that they
were not convinced of the defend-
ant's guilt. We interpret their ac-
quittal as no more than their as-
sumption of a power which they had
no right to exercise, but to which
they were disposed through leni-
ency": Steckler v. U. S. (C. C. A.
2, 1925) 7 F(2nd) 59, 60; cf. Car-
rignan v. U. S. (C. C. A. 7, 1923)
290 F. 189; Marshallo v. U. S. (C.
C. A. 2, 1924) 298 F. 74; Gozner
v. U. S. (C. C. A. 6, 1925) 9 F(2nd)
603; and Seiden v. U. S. (C. C. A.
2, 1926) 16 F(2nd) 197.
The present case is interesting as
an example of the division of power
between the judge and the jury.
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Under the federal rule, the offenses
which may be joined in the same
action are not limited to the con-
solidation of counts which might
have been joined at common law,
but the trial court is merely vested
with discretion to refuse to permit
joinder if it would prevent a fair
trial or be unjust to the defendant:
10 Stat. 162 (18 U. S. C. A. 557);
Dolan v. U. S. (C. C. A. 8, 1904)
133 F. 440; Kidwell v. U. S. (1912)
38 App. D. C. 566. Each count in
an indictment is regarded as if it
were a separate indictment: Lath-
am v. The Queen, 5 "Best and Smith
635; Selvester v. U. S. (1897) 170
U. S. 262. 18 S. Ct. 580. Thus
it has been held that the number
of counts in an indictment may be
determined by the number of pur-
chases of narcotics made from de-
fendant by the government agents:
Blockburger v. U. S. (1932) 284
U. S. -, 52 S. Ct. 180, and see
comment (;March, 1932) 22 Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology
902. Whether or not the maximum
penalty may be assessed on each
count charging a separate offense
and the sentences made to run con-
secutively instead of concurrently
is in the discretion of the judge:
Blockburger v. U. S. supra; Par-
magini v. U. S. (C. C. A. 9, 1930)
42 F(2nd) 721. (There the de-
fendant amassed five consecutive
sentences aggregating seventeen
years in the penitentiary plus $17,-
000 in fines by reason of his viola-
tion of five different statutes by a
single sale of narcotics.)
Thus, in allocating the powers of
the different instrumentalities in
the administration of criminal law,
it is seen (1) that the government
agents can prepare evidence for
many counts in an indictment
merely by inducing several breaches
of the statute by the defendant, as
by making many different purchases
of liquor or narcotics from him.
(2) The prosecutor can add to the
number of counts by drawing a sep-
arate one for each of the different
laws that the defendant has trans-
gressed in the illegal transaction, or
he can limit the number of counts
by grouping all of the purchases
into the same count. (3) The court,
in its discretion, may refuse joinder
of counts it deems unjust to the
defendant. (4) The court may
make its sentence on each count run
concurrently or consecutively. (5)
But the jury may check the judge's
power to levy consecutive sentences
on the different counts by finding
the defendant guilty on only so
many of the counts as it wishes to
see punished, and it may exercise
this power in spite of the fact that




ATED TESTIMONY OF AccoMPLICE.-
[Texas] Defendant was convicted
of the crime of incest with his six-
teen year old daughter and sen-
tenced to eight years in the peni-
tentiary. The only evidence sup-
porting the conviction was the
clearly uncorroborated testimony of
defendant's daughter, the prosecu-
trix, who testified that her consent
was induced by, promises to buy
her new clothes. No other force or
persuasion appeared. Held: judg-
ment reversed as the prosecutrix
was, as a matter of law, an accom-
plice so the conviction could not be
sustained in the absence of corrob-
orating testimony. Tindall v. State
(1931) 43 S. W. (2d) 1101.
From this reversal it is quite ap-
parent that Texas is one of the
jurisdictions which refuses W follow
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the common law that the uncorrob-
orated testimony of an accomplice,
if it satisfies the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, may be sufficient
to warrant a conviction. This re-
sult has been reached by statute:
"A conviction cannot be had upon
the testimony of an accomplice un-
less corroborated by other evidence
tending to connect the defendant
with the offense committed; * * *":
Vernon's Annotated Code of Crim-
inal Procedure of Texas (1925)
Article 718. Laying aside the ques-
tion of the advisability of such a
statute, it would appear, at first
glance, that it could easily be ad-
ministered. However, the courts
have found the same difficulties in
its application which have been en-
countered in numerous other stat-
utes designed to change or abrogate
well settled law by a statement made
in general terms but lacking in a
well defined exposition of legisla-
tive intent. The principal difficulty
the Texas courts have encountered
with the above statute is to deter-
mine who is an accomplice. In the
instant case, the decision held that
a person, regardless of her age, par-
ticipating in an incestuous relation-
ship, was an accomplice within the
meaning of the statute, in the ab-
sence of "force, threats, fraud, or
undue influence" practiced by the
defendant, the other participating
party.
The point which seemed to inter-
est the court most was whether the
defendant's promise to buy the
prosecutrix clothes constituted such
undue influence as to take the
prosecutrix from the court's defini-
tion of an accomplice. The court
decided this mercenary persuasion
did not amount to undue influence
so that the prosecutrix was treated
as an accomplice as a matter of
law, regardless of her age, in ac-
cordance with a long line of prior
Texas decisions: Mercer v. State
(1884) 17 Tex. App. 452; Brad-
shaw v. State (1917) 82 Tex. Cr.
R. 351, 198 S. W. 942; Cottrell v.
State (1922) 91 Tex. Cr. R. 506,
240 S. W. 313; Master v. Stoie
(1925) 100 Tex. Cr. R. 30, 271
S. W. 920.
The reasoning used by the Texas
court in this incest case is charac-
teristic of other decisions on this
point. If force, threats, fraud, or
undue influence are absent, then the
prosecutrix is assumed to have par-
ticipated voluntarily, is an accom-
plice as a matter of law, and a con-
viction on her testimony alone can-
not be sustained. It is submitted
that the logic of the court would be
less open to question if, in deter-
mining whether she was an accom-
plice or not, it also had taken into
consideration the age of the prose-
cutrix in order to decide whether
her participation was voluntary.
The age of consent in Texas is
eighteen: Vernon's Annotated
Penal Code of Texas (1925) Arti-
cle 1183. Consequently, as the
prosecutrix was under the age of
consent, it is difficult to conceive
how she could have voluntarily
consented to participate in an in-
cestuous act, when the law pre-
scribes that she cannot so consent,
out of regard for her immaturity,
until she reaches the age of con-
sent. Even in the absence of force,
fraud, threats and undue influence,
the prosecutrix could not consent
or participate voluntarily as the
law had removed her power to con-
sent, without regard to her blood
relationship to the male participant.
The law had removed the "volition"
of the prosecutrix and yet the court
assumed that, regardless of her im-
maturity, she could voluntarily con-
sent to the incestuous relationship,
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would be a particeps criminis, and
hence an accomplice.
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in
construing an almost identical stat-
ute (Code of Iowa, 1927, Chapter
647, Sectiori 13901) has taken into
consideration the age of the prose-
cutrix, the alleged accomplice, in
order to determine whether it
would be possible in law for her
to consent to the incestuous rela-
tionship: State v. Goodsell (1908)
138 Ia. 504, 116 N. -W. 605; State
v. Sparks (1914) 167 Ia. 746, 149
N. W. 871; State v. Stalker (1915)
169 Ia. 396, 151 N. W. 527; State
v. Pelser (1917) 182 Ia. I, 163
N. W. 600; State v. Chambers
(1893) 87 Ia. 1, 53 N. W. 1090.
The Iowa Court takes into con-
sideration the same distinctions as
does the Texas Court in the case
of a prosecutrix upon whom force,
threats, fraud or undue influence
have been exercised, but adds an
additional distinction in case the
law has destroyed the prosecutrix'
power to consent. Certainly if the
law makes the consent of the prose-
cutrix impossible, she can logically
no more consent to the act than if
force, fraud or undue influence
were practiced upon her. In either
case, her volition is gone, and she
should not be held an accomplice
within the meaning of the statute.
It is submitted that the Iowa con-
struction of this accomplice statute
in an incest case is preferable
where the common law rule has
been abrogated by legislation. How-
ever, the great mass of decisions
construing such statutes, with their
hair line distinctions concerning
accomplices, illustrates the futility
of such legislation. Such a statute
creates a rule of evidence inflexible
in form, yet it must be applied in
numberless criminal cases of in-
finite variety. Obviously, in order
to avoid hardships, each case should
be considered on its facts in order
to determine whether a witness is
an accomplice; no general rule is
possible. In order to considei the
individual case, jurisdictions hav-
ing such a statute have evolved a
subterfuge of distinctions and in-
terpretations. Such distinctions and
interpretations, a few of which are
illustrated in the instant case, de-
part from the purpose of the statute
which is designed to be a mere rule
of evidence, and yet such subter-
fuges are inevitable if justice is to
be reached in the individual case.
It is unfortunate that jurisdictions
having such a statute thrust upon
them by their legislature are forced
to so manipulate their decisions.
Certainly the common law rule of
accomplice testimony obviates the
necessity of having to consider who
are accomplices and whether their
testimony has been corroborated or
not. The simplicity of its: opera-
tion in the individual case, as com-
pared with the usual accomplice
statute, does much to commend its
continued existence.
HENRY R. BARBER.
